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Occupational Licensing and Asymmetric
Information: Post-Hurricane Evidence
from Florida
David Skarbek
Federal, state, and county governments accept the argument that
occupational licensing protects consumers and improves their welfare.
This argument stands in stark contrast to the apparent rent seeking that
occurs with licensing. In return for gains from state-created barriers to
entry, coalitions built along occupational lines support politicians (Stigler
1971: 3–21). 
This article will show that government action in times of crisis is often
inconsistent with its rhetoric. Licensing is typically justified on the
grounds that market mechanisms will not mitigate the problems associat-
ed with asymmetric information. In the wake of Hurricanes Frances and
Katrina, Florida reduced restrictions on construction contractors, yet in
times of crises informational asymmetries are more likely to be problem-
atic. By examining the volume of work completed, I find little evidence of
significant detrimental effects from the policy change. Given the relative
success of reducing restrictions and the government’s explicit recognition
of licensing’s limiting effect on the availability of roofers, reform of licens-
ing, at least to the extent done in crisis, should be adopted permanently.
Why Occupational Licensing?
The dominant position in economics is that licensing restricts supply,
increases prices, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers. This 
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position extends as far back as Adam Smith’s warning of the monopolistic
tendencies of licensing in The Wealth of Nations (1994: 136–37) where
he wrote, “The exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade necessarily
restrains the competition, in the town where it is established, to those who
are free of the trade.” In the 20th century, Friedman and Kuznets (1945),
Friedman (1962: 137–60), and Kleiner (2006), among many others, reit-
erated and expanded the argument that licensing is monopolistic and is
intended to secure rents to practitioners.
On the other hand, many economists argue that information asymme-
tries justify licensing laws. Akerlof’s “lemons model” (1970) demonstrates
that markets may be thin or nonexistent when buyers and sellers cannot
adequately convey information about product quality. If average quality
dictates price, then higher quality products would not receive acceptable
remuneration and would be withheld from the market. Poor quality prod-
ucts, in contrast, receive greater remuneration than if the market has per-
fect information; individuals are thus encouraged to dilute the market
with more lemons. The result is that exchanges do not take place.
Leland (1979) applies Akerlof’s framework to occupational licensing laws
and finds that a minimum quality standard can improve welfare. However,
he notes that this conclusion does not consider alternative methods of
reducing the problems associated with asymmetric information; other poli-
cies may achieve this end more effectively. Law and Kim (2005) discuss the
historical development of licensing laws during the Progressive Era and
examine what they consider the dominant view among economists—that
licensing restricts entry and reduces competition. They argue information-
al asymmetries, which were exacerbated due to increasing urbanization and
advances in knowledge, explain the enactment of many of these laws and
provide justification for them on economic grounds.
There are many market mechanisms in place that mitigate the problems
associated with asymmetric information. As Akerlof himself suggested, sell-
ers often offer warranties and establish a brand name in order to provide
information to buyers about product quality (Akerlof 1970). The desire for
repeat business gives producers an incentive to provide true information
about the quality of goods. Certification from third parties, such as the
Better Business Bureau or Consumer Reports, provides another means for
buyers to obtain assurances about product quality (Klein 2001).
Government’s justification for licensing is generally not as sophisticat-
ed or explicit as the explanations put forth by economists; however, the
language used to indicate legislative intent does suggest the presumption
of information asymmetry problems. Florida Statute 32, chap. 489.101
and 489.113, discussing construction contractors, states: “The Legislature
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deems it necessary in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare
to regulate the construction industry,” and that purpose is realized by
“establish[ing] . . . competency and qualifications.” This statute presumes
that consumers are not capable of adequately identifying the competen-
cy and qualifications of roofing contractors, and that the state of Florida
can benefit the public through licensing.
Government in Action: The Case of Florida’s Roofers
In 2004, Hurricane Frances made landfall in Florida causing over $9 bil-
lion in damages. In response, Governor Jeb Bush issued executive order
04–188, which temporarily reduced restrictions on roofing contractors. 
The executive order stated that a “certified, or registered, general,
building, or residential, contractor is not required to subcontract roofing
work.” Temporary licenses were offered to contractors presenting an affi-
davit of competency from their original jurisdiction. The Department of
Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR) issued a press release
announcing the intentions of the executive order: “This Order provides
relief for Hurricane Frances victims by creating a larger pool of licensed
individuals to choose from” (Department of Business and Professional
Regulation 2004).
Less than a month later, Governor Bush extended this order to all
counties in Florida. The Tampa Bay Business Journal described the exec-
utive order: “City and county governments can now issue specialty-roof-
ing licenses without the need for additional local enacting ordinances.
The specialty licenses can be issued to both in-state and out-of-state con-
tractors who fulfill the requirements” (Tampa Bay Business Journal
2004).
The language of the executive order, the DBPR press release, and the
interpretation of local journalists, all recognize that reducing restrictions
would increase the availability of roofers. Licensed roofers from out of
state, as well as Florida contractors not licensed to roof, flooded into the
counties worst hit and assisted in the rebuilding process. 
In 2005, following Hurricane Katrina, Governor Bush issued executive
order 05-148, which similarly extended 60-day provisional licenses to
roofers who were not normally allowed to practice. 
The Impact of Reducing Restrictions
If licensing is justified by asymmetric information, it is in times of crises
that asymmetric information is likely to be most problematic. Market
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mechanisms that mitigate asymmetric information are operating more
poorly, partly due to the licensing reductions themselves. For example,
out-of-state roofers who are forbidden from practicing in-state year round
are less likely to develop reputations for quality. If they were allowed to
work in Florida all of the time, then these sellers would be able to capture
the long-term benefits that a good reputation and repeat business brings. 
Asymmetric information may also worsen because search has become
more expensive. In times of crisis, there are often higher costs associated
with search. In normal times when a roof is aging an owner has time to
shop around and gather information on a roofer’s reputation, but when a
roof has been ripped off in a storm any delay while obtaining information
could result in greater damage to the home. Obtaining information about
product quality is more costly. The difficulty of even getting an estimate
from a roofer aggravated this problem. Hector Perez, who needed his
roof fixed in 2005, shared his experience: “I don’t trust anybody, I double-
check everything, but we had called literally 50 roofers, and Leo Pass was
the only one who called back” (Holland 2006). People are less likely and
capable of obtaining information about product quality after a storm.
The economy was also subject to greater uncertainty due to Florida’s
price-gouging laws, which came into force when the emergency was
declared. In times of crisis, roofers are apprehensive about giving esti-
mates because of the increased volatility of supplier prices and the fear of
prosecution under price-gouging laws if they overestimate future supply
prices. Roofing contractor Rob Kornahrens used to keep price quotes
available for 30 days. The increase in supply prices following the 2005
hurricane season forced him to change his policy: “We can’t keep a price
quote open for more than 10 days anymore because our costs are rising
so fast” (Benedick 2005). During this time, producers are unsure of how
the prices will change and how price-gouging laws will be applied. As a
result, prices convey less information and supply is withheld. 
Asymmetric information is potentially inefficient because it leads to
exchanges not taking place at all. Standard welfare theory defines the pur-
chase of poor quality products as simply a transfer of wealth rather than a
cost. Quality per se, then, is not the focus; the ultimate concern is fore-
gone exchanges. 
If the existence of asymmetric information were a significant problem,
then when general contractors and out-of-state roofers began practicing,
we would expect to see the quantity of work decline. Figure 1 shows the
amount of Florida’s GDP that is from the construction industry and its
percentage of total state GDP. Ideally, we would have data on just the
roofing industry, but the most specific data available are at the broader
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level of the construction industry. These data give some idea of how the
roofing industry grew. Clearly, both the volume of work and the percent-
age of total state GDP are increasing, which suggests that asymmetric
information did not thin the market. 
News accounts indicate the roofing industry was booming. Steve
Munnell, director of the Florida Roofing, Sheet Metal and Air
Conditioning Contractors Association, reported, “roofers are swamped”
(Pleasant 2004a). Representatives at building departments in the counties
of Lake Wales, Lakeland, Winter Haven and unincorporated Polk said
there was an exponential increase in the number of roofing permits
(Pleasant 2004b).
If the existence of asymmetric information were a significant problem,
then when general contractors and out-of-state roofers began practicing,
we would expect to see the quantity of work decline. This did not happen.
Another approach for gauging the effects of asymmetric information is to
examine the quality of goods received. While this is not the standard wel-
fare theory concern, examining data on product quality is useful in judging
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figure 1
Construction Industry GDP
(Millions of Current Dollars)
the ability of markets to handle asymmetric information in emergencies. 
Measuring product quality is difficult because there are many aspects
of a good that are impossible to quantify or even identify explicitly. Still,
news stories and complaints filed with the Department of Business and
Professional Regulation can help paint a partial picture of conditions in
the roofing market.
After the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, local newspapers noted an
increase in complaints against contractors. There are many reasons that
complaints against contractors may have increased. First, and most obvi-
ously, the increase in construction activity after the hurricanes would tend
to increase the number of complaints filed. More work is going to lead to
more complaints. Second, a portion of the complaints probably stems
from overbooking by honest contractors who were simply overwhelmed
by the surge in demand. J. D. Hasselbach, vice president of sales for a
Florida roofing supplier, described the magnitude of the situation: “We
have 50 gallons we’re trying to put in a one-quart jar when it comes to
demand” (Pleasant 2004b). Third, the lack of building supplies, which
subsequently led to long waits, frustrated homeowners. Hasselbach said
the supply shortage “is the worst I’ve seen it in 30 years. It’s worse than
Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Hugo” (Pleasure 2004b). One news
article reported that the wait time for materials was 20 weeks (Pacenti
2005).
Valerie Messier of the Martin County Contractor Licensing office rec-
ognized the frustration of consumers but offers the tempered view that
the complaints reflect on only a small minority of contractors: “We have
4,500 (contractors) on file. A handful has caused problems” (Taylor 2006).
Natural disasters often make communities the targets for con men. Joel
Dramis, technical services manager for Port St. Lucie’s building depart-
ment, noted that many of the complaints are directed at people who are
simply “smooth-talking salesmen, not contractors” (Taylor 2006).
Licensed Florida contractors have also been found guilty of fraud—evi-
dence that licensing is not a magic bullet to end corruption.
According to the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation’s Annual Reports, the number of complaints against business-
es in the construction industry did increase in 2004 and 2005 (Figure 2).
“Complaints Received” includes any complaint filed by a consumer, and
the complaints with “Probable Cause” are those that were determined
possibly to involve an actual legal violation or inadequate workmanship.
Despite increases in complaints received, there was only a minor increase
in the number of complaints found to have probable cause. To give some
perspective, recall the increasing volume of work performed by the con-
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struction industry (Figure 1). The number of complaints cannot be
weighted directly for volume of work because they are collected by the
fiscal year, which starts on July 1, and the industry-specific GDP data are
collected by the calendar year. Nonetheless, even using the earlier GDP
year to compare the fiscal year’s number of complaints (which would tend
to overstate the frequency of complaints per dollar of work) there would
still be only 2,981 complaints with probable cause for $47.7 billion in con-
struction work—one for every $16 million of work done. 
Although asymmetric information did not prevent the market from
operating and there were few complaints given the volume of work, there
was a more than proportional increase in complaints filed compared to
the increase in construction volume. construction industry revenue
increased 35.5 percent from 2003 to 2005, complaints increased 101 per-
cent, and complaints with probable cause increased 120 percent from fis-
cal year 2003–04 to 2005–06. Since roofing as a percentage of Florida’s
construction GDP was rising over this time period, the data likely over-
state the proportional change in complaints. Examining the period after
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Fiscal Year
figure 2
Complaints against the Construction Industry
the restrictions were first reduced, however, indicates that construction
industry revenue increased 16.2 percent and complaints received
increased 32 percent, but complaints with probable cause increased only
1.1 percent. After an initial spike in both complaints received and com-
plaints with probable cause, the complaints with probable cause leveled
off. Data limitations prevent us from knowing exactly why this happened,
but it may be that contractors adapted to the new regulatory regime, sup-
ply volatility, and demand shocks. 
The severity of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, which led to
surges in demand and supply shortages all along the Gulf Coast, con-
tributed to an economic environment that was more volatile. Although
these data are less than ideal because they look at the entire construction
industry, it appears that reductions in licensing restrictions, and the
increase in asymmetric information that would follow, did not lead to a fall
in the quantity of work. 
Florida is not the only state to reduce licensing restriction in times of
emergency. Louisiana reduced licensing restrictions in the weeks follow-
ing Hurricane Katrina. Governor Kathleen Blanco issued executive
orders that reduced restrictions on medical professionals and personnel,
veterinarians, towing operators, charter schools, and proprietary schools.
While there may have been extenuating circumstances due to the severi-
ty of the crisis, such as the inability to accept licensing fees or offer exam-
inations, to reduce restrictions in such times suggests that there may be
public choice rather than public interest reasons for licensing in the first
place.
Conclusion
Hurricanes Frances and Katrina were impetus for Florida to reduce
licensing requirements. This response raises questions about the extent of
state intervention in the economy in normal times.
People recovering in the wake of a hurricane have less information
about goods and services. The usual market mechanisms, which guide
individuals by providing information and encouraging cooperative behav-
ior, are impaired. During a disaster, asymmetric information is likely to
worsen. Yet, it is in the aftermath of two of the worst hurricanes in U.S.
history that Florida chose to relax the licensing laws that allegedly miti-
gate these problems.
This then raises the question, If citizens of Florida are capable of judg-
ing the quality of roofing services in the wake of Hurricanes Frances and
Katrina, then why are they not capable of doing so in non-crisis situations
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when they have more time to gather information? It is unlikely that a state
of emergency informs or empowers. Coupled with the explicit admission
that reduced licensing requirements increases the supply of roofers, indi-
viduals should be free to hire out-of-state roofers year round. Florida’s
post-hurricane reforms should be extended to citizens in times of calm as
well as crisis.
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